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I. THE PROBLEM OF BAD PATENTS 
 
The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) finds itself caught in a vise.  
On the one hand, it has been issuing a large number of dubious patents 
over the past twenty years, particularly in the software and electronic 
commerce space.  It issues many more patents than its counterparts in 
 
             †   This lecture is delivered each year by a nationally recognized scholar in the field of 
intellectual property law. 
           *    © 2011 Mark A. Lemley. 
          **   William H. Neukom Professor, Stanford Law School; partner, Durie Tangri LLP. 
Thanks to Rose Hagan, Bruce Hayden, and Stu Soffer for comments. 
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Europe and Japan;1 roughly three-fourths of applicants ultimately get 
one or more patents, a higher percentage than in other countries.2  
Complaints about those bad patents are legion,3 and indeed, when they 
make it to litigation, they are quite often held invalid.4  Even the ones 
that turn out to be valid are often impossible to understand; in the 
information technology industries, there is no lawsuit filed in which the 
parties don’t fight over the meaning of patent claim terms.5  The natural 
reaction is to say that the PTO needs to do more than it does to make 
sure it is awarding patents only to those who deserve them. 
On the other hand, it is not clear that we can or should weed out bad 
applications at the PTO.  The vast majority of patents are never litigated 
or licensed; spending a lot of money to ensure their validity would be 
wasted.6  And the structure of the patent prosecution process makes it 
very difficult for the PTO to do so.  Patent examiners can never finally 
reject a patent application; applicants dissatisfied with the outcome can 
come back an unlimited number of times to try again through various 
mechanisms.7  Efforts beginning in 2006 to change that rule upset patent 
lawyers a great deal and were ultimately abandoned.8  And because of 
the inability of the PTO to finally reject applications, when the PTO 
started making it harder to get patents several years ago, the result was 
to create an enormous backlog of patent applications as examiners 
would reject applications and applicants would try again (and again, and 
again) to get a patent.  That backlog in turn created its own set of 
 
1. Bruno Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, The Quality Factor in Patent Systems 29 
(European Ctr. for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics, Working Paper No. 
2010-027), available at 
http://www.epip.eu/conferences/epip05/papers/van%20Pottelsberghe.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 
2011).  
2. Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 
EMORY L.J. 181, 182 (2008). 
3. ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR 
BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO 
DO ABOUT IT (2004).   
4. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated 
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 194, 208 (1998) (showing that, within a sample of 299 patents 
litigated in 239 cases, 138 patents were held invalid); John R. Allison et al., Patent Quality and 
Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677 (2011). 
5. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATION AT RISK (2008).   
6. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 
1510–11 (2001).   
7. Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 
B.U. L. REV. 63 (2004).   
8.  Tafas v. Kappos, 586 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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problems, delaying the issuance of good patents and reducing certainty 
for both applicants and third parties. 
Some have suggested that those delays—and the use of continuation 
applications more generally—are the result of oddities in the system for 
evaluating and rewarding patent examiners.  The so-called “count” 
system gave credit to examiners for certain acts; patent lawyers often 
complain that examiners “make” them file continuations in order to 
boost their counts. Whether or not that was true, however, it doesn’t 
appear to be behind the growth of continuation applications.  The PTO 
changed the count system in 2009 to try to address this problem. And it 
has been issuing record numbers of patents in recent months. But 
preliminary data from Dennis Crouch suggests that the number of 
continuation applications is still on the rise, up 27 percent from 2009 to 
2010,9 suggesting that the use of continuations is largely applicant- 
rather than examiner-driven. 
The evaluation of patent applications in the PTO is further 
complicated by recent empirical evidence.  One recent study shows that 
junior patent examiners are a lot more zealous in weeding out bad 
patents than senior examiners.10  The longer examiners spend in the 
PTO, the less searching they do, the more likely they are to grant 
patents, and the more likely they are to grant patents on applications 
that their counterparts in other countries have rejected.11  A second 
study shows that, whether senior or junior, examiners pay attention 
almost exclusively to prior art that they find themselves, and not to 
information submitted by patent applicants, even applicants who are 
passing on art found by patent examiners in other countries.12  The 
implication of this evidence is that we need to pay attention not only to 
legal rules but also to examiner behavior and reward systems. 
II. CAN THE PROBLEM BE SOLVED? 
How, then, can we fix the PTO, allowing examiners to distinguish 
 
9. Dennis Crouch, Requests for Continued Examination Continue to Rise, PATENTLY-
O BLOG (Jul. 8, 2010, 10:56 A.M.), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/07/requests-for-
continued-examination-continue-to-rise.html. 
10. Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Examiner Characteristics and Patent Office 
Outcomes, 93 REV. ECON. STAT. (forthcoming 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1329091 (last visited Feb. 21, 2011). 
11.  Id.  
12.  Christopher A. Cotropia et al., Do Applicant Patent Citations Matter? Implications 
for the Presumption of Validity (Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 401, 
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1656568. 
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between patentable and unpatentable inventions effectively, without 
slowing the process to a crawl or wasting a bunch of money? 
A. What Won’t Work 
First, some things that likely won’t work. 
1. Preventing Fee Diversion.   
The PTO is funded through user fees imposed on applicants and 
owners of issued patents.  For much of the last twenty years, some of 
that fee revenue (typically 10 to 20 percent of it) has been diverted by 
Congress to general federal revenue.  It is a commonplace among patent 
lawyers that the way to solve the PTO’s problems is to stop fee 
diversion, “fully funding” the PTO. 
Stopping fee diversion is certainly a good idea.  Whatever the merits 
of government user fees over taxes as a general matter, it seems 
particularly foolish social policy to tax innovators in particular to raise 
general revenue.  But stopping fee diversion is hardly a panacea. In the 
last several years, the PTO has been fully funded—that is, Congress 
didn’t divert fees.13 Nonetheless, the backlog grew. The addition of 10 to 
20 percent of operating revenue wasn’t enough even to enable the PTO 
to hold steady. 
2. Fee-setting Authority.   
In recent years the PTO’s efforts have shifted to seeking permission 
from Congress to set their own fees.14  This would allow the PTO to 
raise fees on applicants and patentees, using the money to pay for a 
more intensive examination.  There is some reason to believe that fee-
setting authority, if nothing else, may result from the six-year patent 
reform effort in Congress.15 
 
13.  In 2011, Congress again diverted fees for the first time in several years.  John 
Schmid, Congress Deals Setback to Patent Office, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 17, 2011, 
http://www.jsonline.com/business/120041914.html (last visited Jun. 6, 2011).   
14.  Arti K. Rai, Growing Pains in the Administrative State: The Patent Office’s 
Troubled Quest for Managerial Control, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2051, 2067–68 (2009). 
15.    The issue is bound up with the larger question of the role of the PTO as a full-
fledged administrative agency with rulemaking authority.  For discussion of that issue, see 
Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai,  Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural Perspective. 77 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 47 (2008); John R. Thomas, The Responsibility of the Rulemaker: 
Comparative Approaches to Patent Administration Reform 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 727 
(2002); Lisa Vertinsky, Comparing Alternative Institutional Paths to Patent Reform. 61 ALA. 
L. REV. 501, 546–49 (2010).  
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Giving the PTO the authority to set its own fees might or might not 
be a good idea, depending on the relative incentives the PTO and 
Congress have to set fees rationally.  But as noted above, it is likely not 
a good idea simply to spend more money to weed out bad patents.  Most 
of that money will be wasted on applications that are of no consequence 
to anyone.  And because of the structure of the examination system, it 
might not even succeed in weeding out bad patent applications. 
Even if it did, however, the current fee structure makes patent 
quality self-limiting.  The PTO is paid by applicants to process their 
applications at each stage. But those payments are not enough even to 
sustain the limited examination that now occurs. The difference is made 
up by patent “maintenance fees”—periodic payments made by the 
owners of issued patents to keep those patents in force.  Because the 
PTO’s ability to examine new applications is dependent on revenue 
from previously granted ones, the PTO faces a problem: the more bad 
applications it rejects, the fewer patents will pay maintenance fees, and 
the less money it will have to conduct a detailed examination.  The PTO 
ran into this problem in the late 2000s, when—as a result of a lowered 
grant rate coupled with companies abandoning patents during the 
recession—it found itself in a financial crisis.  The broader lesson should 
be clear: the current system for funding the PTO works only if the PTO 
continues to issue patents on a large percentage of the applications it 
receives. 
The PTO might begin to address this problem by changing the way it 
collects fees.  At one extreme, it could abandon maintenance fees 
altogether, and pay for enhanced examination through higher 
application fees.  That solves the self-limiting problem, but it raises the 
cost to startups seeking patents at an early stage of development, which 
may not be ideal.  Alternatively, the PTO could simply raise the 
maintenance fees significantly, to perhaps ten times their current rate.  
Doing so might make the weeding out of bad patents revenue neutral, 
though as more bad applications are rejected, the tax on those who 
actually obtained patents would have to increase further to compensate.  
And as the PTO raises its maintenance fees, fewer people will choose to 
maintain their patents.  Depending on the elasticity of demand, paying 
for examination out of higher maintenance fees may or may not work. 
Some have suggested raising maintenance fees for a different 
reason—to prevent patent lawsuits by trolls who buy up patents in order 
to enforce them.  But that is unlikely to work.  According to a 2009 
American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) report, the 
median cost of taking a major patent case to trial is $5.5 million per side 
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in attorney’s fees.16  A maintenance fee of $40,000−$50,000—ten times 
the current fee—may weed out more patents that aren’t being used, but 
it is unlikely to deter someone considering spending perhaps 100 times 
that much to litigate a patent.  And the patents that aren’t being used 
aren’t really the problem.17 
3. Retaining Patent Examiners.   
Another problem commonly cited by patent lawyers is the high rate 
of turnover at the PTO.  Being an examiner is not an easy job, and it 
doesn’t pay all that well.  Not surprisingly, examiners often leave 
relatively quickly for jobs in engineering, law firms, or to go to law 
school.  Indeed, one recent study found the median examiner had been 
at the PTO for just over three years.18  The high rate of turnover means 
that the PTO needs to hire more than 1,000 examiners a year just to 
keep even with attrition.  In recent years the PTO has found it virtually 
impossible to grow the examining corps.  And of course, those new 
examiners must be trained.  Perhaps the solution to the PTO’s 
problems, then, is to find ways to keep those examiners from leaving. 
There may well be benefits to reducing examiner attrition.  But the 
evidence suggests that weeding out bad patents is not among them.  
Empirical research by Lemley and Sampat shows that the longer 
examiners spend at the PTO, the less searching they do, the less likely 
they are to issue initial rejections or demand claim amendments, and the 
more likely they are to ultimately grant a patent.19  It is the most junior 
examiners who are most likely to reject applications.20  The reason is not 
precisely clear, but may have to do with increased workloads on senior 
examiners, or with acculturation into a corps whose ethos is to grant 
rather than deny patents.  Either way, keeping examiners around longer 
may hurt rather than help the cause of weeding out bad patents. 
4. Outsourcing Search.   
Reacting both to workload and to a sense that examiners don’t find 
the most important prior art, a number of initiatives both within and 
 
16.  AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION (AIPLA), REPORT 
OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2009 29 (July 2009).   
17. Raising maintenance fees would weed out patents that sit on a shelf now but might 
be sold in the future to a troll that will assert them against product companies.  In that limited 
sense it might reduce the number of troll lawsuits.  
18.  Lemley & Sampat, supra note 10. 
19.  Id. 
20.  Id. 
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outside the PTO have tried to relieve examiners of the burden of 
searching for prior art.  They have variously proposed to require the 
applicants to do their own search for prior art,21 to invite the public to 
review applications and submit prior art,22 or to share the burden of 
searching with patent examiners in other countries.  These initiatives 
seem promising because they outsource a function examiners don’t 
seem particularly good at—finding the most relevant information on the 
ground—to others who are positioned to do it better. 
But recent empirical evidence suggests that it might not work.  
Cotropia et al. studied the behavior of patent examiners in responding 
to applications, and found that they rely almost exclusively on art they 
find for themselves, not art submitted by applicants.  And that doesn’t 
appear to reflect either applicants drafting around the art they found or 
the weakness of that art; U.S. examiners largely ignored even art that 
was submitted because it was found important by a foreign patent 
examiner during examination of a counterpart application.23  If 
examiners are psychologically primed to rely principally on things they 
find for themselves, it won’t help to have others provide them with the 
best art. And it might even hurt, causing examiners not to focus on the 
best prior art. 
B. What Might Work 
The problems with the PTO are deeply rooted.  Increased funding 
won’t solve the problem of bad patents, and a variety of other 
commonly suggested fixes for the PTO are unlikely to solve the 
problem, and indeed could even make it worse. 
Other proposals have a greater chance of addressing the problem of 
bad patents, though they come with their own uncertainties. 
1. Second Pair of Eyes.   
Shortly after the Federal Circuit held business methods patentable in 
1998, the PTO was inundated with business method patent applications.  
Most of those applications went to Class 705, which refers to the 
collection of patent examiners who focus on business methods.  Indeed, 
by 2001, Class 705 had the largest application volume.  In response to 
this flood, the PTO initiated a specific “quality control” measure in this 
 
21.  There is currently no such requirement. 
22.  Beth Simone Noveck, “Peer to Patent”: Collective Intelligence, Open Review, and 
Patent Reform, 20 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 123, 145 (2006). 
23.  Cotropia et al., supra note 12.  
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class in March 2000: the “second pair of eyes” review (SPER), under 
which applications are subjected to mandatory assessment by more than 
one examiner before being allowed.24  Requiring two examiners to agree 
seems to have had a dramatic effect: a 2008 study found that class 705 
has the lowest grant rate among high volume classes.25  One possible 
explanation for the low grant rate in this class is that the second pair of 
eyes is working, and that the grant rate reflects better rigor during 
examinations, rather than application volume. 
The fact that SPER leads to more rejections in Class 705 doesn’t 
mean it is an unalloyed success, however.  Allison and Hunter 
demonstrate that its adoption in Class 705 led applicants to try to 
characterize their business method patents in ways that got them out of 
Class 705.  It is possible that the applications that were not so 
characterized were systematically weaker (or their lawyers 
systematically less skilled) than the ones that avoided Class 705.  The 
differences Lemley and Sampat found were so striking, however—a 16.1 
percent grant rate in Class 705, compared with 72 percent on average26—
that it seems unlikely this can explain the full difference. 
Allison and Hunter’s objection is significant.  But it applies only to a 
class-specific use of SPER, and woudn’t condemn a broader application 
of the policy to all art units.  Nonetheless, there are reasons to think 
carefully before expanding SPER to all patent applications.  Doing so 
would roughly double the cost of patent prosecution across the board.  
It would also delay the prosecution process further; Class 705 
applications are among the slowest to be processed.  Further, at least as 
currently configured, SPER is asymmetric: it requires a second hurdle 
before allowing patents but not before rejecting applications.27  As a 
result, it is likely to weed out bad patents, but also to catch some good 
ones within the net of rejected applications.  Given the PTO’s historic 
bias in the other direction, perhaps that is a risk worth taking, but it is 
 
24.  John R. Allison & Starling D. Hunter, On the Feasibility of Improving Patent 
Quality One Technology at a Time: The Case of Business Methods, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
729, 734 (2006).  
25.  Lemley & Sampat, supra note 2, at 200–01.   
26.  Id. at 198–99.   
27.  There was a similar problem with the PTO’s quality review mechanism, which 
reviews a random subset of grants. Examiners can be punished for mistaken grants if caught 
in the quality control process, but are not punished for mistaken rejections, which are never 
reviewed.  Ron D. Katznelson, Patent Examination Policy and the Social Costs of Examiner 
Allowance and Rejection Errors, Stanford Technology Law Review Symposium on PTO 
Reform (Feb. 26, 2010). Effective October 1, 2010, the PTO changed its quality evaluation 
system to be more evenhanded. 
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still a social cost we should avoid if we can.  If SPER or some other 
review process is to be adopted, it should apply evenhandedly to grants 
and rejections. 
Interestingly, the PTO recently shut down the SPER program in 
business methods.  Too much success, it seems, carries its own risks. 
2. Changing Examiner Incentives.   
Recent empirical evidence suggests that much of the problem with 
patent examination revolves around examiner incentives and human 
resource policies.  Examiners do less well at policing bad patents the 
longer they stay at the PTO.  The problem could be their distance from 
the technology, or a tenure effect, or their increased workload.  In any 
case, changes in training, workload, or promotion rules could affect 
those incentives.  Examiners pay attention to their own searches, and 
not prior art submitted by others. The problem could be overconfidence 
bias, or simply triage.  Either way, human resource policies could be 
brought to bear, training examiners to search better, giving them more 
time, or finding other ways to eliminate bias. And it seems obvious—
though likely politically infeasible—that the rules should not treat 
allowances differently from rejections.28 
These are good ideas, and they are worth exploring further.  But 
implementation may be politically difficult.  And some of the possible 
explanations point in different directions: should we give examiners 
more time to search, or less, for example? 
3. Tiered Review.   
The problem is not precisely that the Patent Office issues a large 
number of bad patents.  Rather, it is that the Patent Office issues a small 
but worrisome number of economically significant bad patents and 
those patents enjoy a strong, but undeserved, presumption of validity. 
Framed this way, the solution naturally follows: the Patent Office 
should focus its examination resources on important patents and pay 
little attention to the rest.  But it is difficult for the government to know 
ahead of time which patents are likely to be important. 
There are two groups, however, that have better information about 
the likely technological and commercial value of inventions: patent 
applicants and competitors.  To harness information in the hands of 
patent applicants, we could give applicants the option of earning a 
 
28.  Katznelson, supra note 27.  
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presumption of validity by paying for a thorough examination of their 
inventions.  In other words, “applicants should be allowed to ‘gold plate’ 
their patents by paying for the kind of searching review that would merit 
a presumption of validity.”29  By contrast, “[a]n applicant who chooses 
not to pay could still get a patent.  That patent, however, would be 
subject to serious—maybe even de novo—review in the event of 
litigation.”30  Predictably, “applicants would pay for serious review with 
respect to their most important patents but conserve resources on their 
more speculative entries.”31  Thus, “the Patent Office may focus its 
resources” and thereby “benefit from the signal given by the applicant’s 
own self-interested choice.”32  The Obama campaign proposed this sort 
of tiered review, and the PTO has recently taken a step towards 
implementing a scaled-down version, in which applicants can choose the 
speed but not the intensity of review.33 
Tiered review is only as good as the examination process that creates 
it, however, and if “gold-plated” patents are too easy to obtain, the 
point of the system will be lost.  If they are too hard to obtain or too 
expensive, no one will use the system.  Further, tiered review can at best 
be only a partial solution, because applicants do not always have 
accurate information about the future value of their applications.  These 
are real objections, but they do not undermine the value of some sort of 
targeting in the use of PTO examination resources. 
4. Oppositions and Adversarial Evaluations.   
Competitors also have useful information about which patents worry 
them and which do not.  A post-grant opposition system would seek to 
harness that information.  Post-grant opposition is a process by which 
parties other than the applicant would have the opportunity to request 
and fund a thorough examination of a recently issued patent.  A patent 
that survives collateral attack would earn a presumption of validity 
similar to the one available through tiered review.  The core difference 
is that the post-grant opposition would be triggered by competitors—
 
29.  Mark A. Lemley et al., What To Do About Bad Patents, 28 REG., no. 4, Winter 
2005 at 10, 12, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv28n4/v28n4-
noted.pdf#page=3. 
30.  Id.  
31.  Id.  For a more detailed working out of the tiered review proposal, see Douglas 
Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. 
REV. 45, 61–63 (2007).  
32.  Lemley et al., supra note 29, at 12.  
33.  Unfortunately, that proposal has been suspended at this writing because of pro fee 
diversion. 
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presumably competitors looking to invalidate a patent that threatens 
their industry. 
Like tiered review, “post-grant opposition is attractive because it 
harnesses private information; this time, information in the hands of 
competitors.”34  Armed with this information, the PTO can better 
“identify patents that warrant serious review, and it also makes that 
review less expensive by creating a mechanism by which competitors 
can share critical information directly with the Patent Office.”35  A post-
grant opposition system is part of proposed patent reform legislation. 
The success of post-grant opposition depends on the willingness of 
third parties with good information about the validity of a patent to 
challenge that patent in a public forum rather than settling privately.  
Some commentators are skeptical, pointing out that invalidating patents 
is a public good that the challenger would share with every other 
competitor.36 
Patent law already has mechanisms that could be used to achieve the 
same goal.  Some issued patents are returned to the PTO after issuance 
and are reevaluated through an adversarial process known as inter 
partes reexamination.  This is an evaluation to which some deference is 
appropriate, though today the law gives complete deference to that 
determination.  Even traditional ex parte reexamination, while not truly 
adversarial, allows the filer to submit an initial explanation of the 
reasons for reexamination, and the result has been that in recent years 
patents fare worse in reexamination than applications do in initial 
examination. 
The biggest risk with post-grant opposition and related systems is 
that we give challengers too many bites at the apple, allowing them to 
inundate patentees with an endless set of challenges.  To solve that 
problem, it is appropriate to place some limits on the number and 
perhaps the timing of challenges, and to imbue patents that survive 
those challenges with a strong presumption of validity. 
 
34.  Lemley et al., supra note 29, at 13. 
35.  Id. 
36.  Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 
24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723, 752–53 (2009); Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives 
to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and 
Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERK. TECH. L.J. 943, 952 (2004) (citing 
Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971); Joseph Scott 
Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating Patents, 19 BERK. 
TECH. L.J. 667, 687–88 (2004). 
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C. Living with Imperfection 
The reform proposals identified in the last section are a start.  They 
likely will improve the prosecution process and help to weed out bad 
patents, and most will do so at an acceptable cost.  But none of them 
will solve the problem of bad patents, or even come especially close to 
doing so.  Part of the process of patent reform must involve 
acknowledging the inherent imperfections in the patent examination 
process, and adapting to those imperfections. 
In particular, we will continue to rely on litigation for the 
foreseeable future as a primary means for weeding out bad patents.  
That is as it should be.  Litigating patentees and competitors will 
uncover information “through the adversarial process, which [is] far 
superior to even the best-intentioned government bureaucracy as a 
mechanism for finding truth.”37  More important, litigation is focused on 
the very few patents (1 to 2 percent) that turn out to be important and 
about which parties cannot agree in a business transaction. 
Litigation can be abused, and examples of patent litigation abuse 
have been rampant in the last two decades.  But a variety of reforms 
have started to bring that problem under control, and the courts have 
the means to continue that process.38 
Part of the process must include a realistic recognition of the 
shortcomings of the patent prosecution system.  In particular, courts 
should weaken the presumption of validity for issued patents.  A 
presumption like that embraced by the current “clear and convincing” 
standard must be earned, and under current rules patent applicants 
don’t earn it.  We should replace that high hurdle with a more 
appropriate level of deference such as the “preponderance of the 
evidence” presumption currently given trademarks and copyrights, in 
recognition of the fact that the scrutiny given patents does not warrant 
more.  And we should apply the presumption with some eye toward 
reality.  “The current presumption is so wooden that courts today 
assume a patent is valid even against evidence that the patent examiner 
never saw, much less considered.”39  That makes no sense.40 
 
37.  Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 31, at 65.  
38.  DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS 
CAN SOLVE IT 100–02 (2009).   
39.  Lemley et al., supra note 29, at 12. 
40.  Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 31, at 61, n.50 (quoting KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, 
Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1745 (2007)).  The Supreme Court passed up on an opportunity to bring 
the presumption in line with reality in Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship and Infrastructures 
for Info.Inc., No. 10-290 (U.S. June 9, 2011). 
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But the presumption of validity should be dynamic, not static.  
Improvements to the patent prosecution process might justify a stronger 
presumption.  In particular, surviving more extensive scrutiny, whether 
by opting into tiered review, being subject to an opposition proceeding, 
or perhaps even getting approval from two examiners rather than one, 
should justify a stronger presumption.  A dynamic presumption will 
allow the courts to play their proper role as the guardians of the public 
interest while encouraging applicants and the PTO to shoulder their 
burden as well. 
 
